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STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT E. SIMMONS, CHARRIE 
BRENNAN, DAVID A. WILLIAMS, 
LOUIE A. SHORT, PATRICIA L. 
CASTILLO, BETH L. HURST, and 
JAY EZRA REA, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, Department of 
Public Safety, Financial Responsibil-
ity Division, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
11771 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This appeal concerns the legality of several driver's 
license revocations by the appellant under Utah's Safety 
Responsibility Law, Section 41-12-5, Utah Code Ann., as 
amended. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
Each of the respondents were involved in an automo-
bile accident. Pursuant to the information available to it, 
the Public Safety Commission asked for a security deposit. 
Upon failure to make said deposit, the Commission revoked 
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.the licenses of the respondents. The respondents petitioned 
the nistrict Court of Salt Lake County for a review. The 
case was heard before the Honorable Bryant H. Croft. 
Judge Croft found for the respondents and ruled that addi-
tional reports were required before the Commission could 
.legally revoke the petitioners' licenses. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversa1 of the lower court's decision 
ordering the restoration of the respondents' licenses and 
seeks an order in harmony with the decision of the Depart-
ment of Public Safety. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondents in this action were all uninsured mo-
torists who were involved in automobile accidents. Upon 
the receipt of various accident reports, body shop estimates, 
and personal injury reports, the Public Safety Commission 
determined that 'in each accident there was either personal 
injury or property damage in excess of one hundred dollars 
($100). 
Pursuant to the Safety Responsibility Act in Utah, the 
Commission set the amount of security deposit which was 
required of the uninsured motorist. Upon failure of the 
respondents to post security as required by Section 41-12-5, 
Utah Code Ann. ( 1960), the Commission suspended their 
driver's licenses. That decision was reversed in the lower 
court. 
Utah Sode Annotated 1953, as amended, shall con-
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. 
UTAH COURTS MUST GIVE ADMINISTRA-
TIVE AGENCIES BROAD POWERS IN MAK-
ING DECISIONS. 
According to a Utah decision, the administrative agen-
cies should be given a free hand when dealing with their 
statutory responsibilities. In the case of Ricker v. Board 
of Ed. of Millard County School Dist., 16 Utah 2d 106, 396 
P. 2d 416 ( 19'64), the court said: 
" ... It is the policy of the law not to favor 
limitations on the powers of the administrative 
body, but rather to give it a free hand to function 
within the sphere of its responsibilities. For that 
reason, it is to be assumed that the board has and 
retains its prerogative of using its best judgment 
... ". Id., 16 Utah 2d at 111, 396 P. 2d at 420. 
In line with this reasoning is the general principle 
that strict rules of evidence are not applicable in hearings 
before administrative agencies. This principle was cor-
rectly stated by Walker v. City of Clinton, 244 Iowa 1009, 
,59 N. W. 2d 784 (1953), as follows: 
"We think it inescapable that the legislature 
intended to give permit-issuing bodies wide discre-
tion in revocations. They are not required to wait 
upon criminal convictions; they need not give notice 
or hold hearings; they are quite apparently not 
bound by technical rules of evidence. They need 
have before them only something which fairly shows 
cause which, in their judgment, indicates a contin-
uation of the license will be inimical to the purposes 
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of chapter 124. The nonapplication of rules of evi-
dence is demonstrated when it is considered that 
since no hearing i6 necessary there would be no one 
to object to offered proof and no one to cross-ex-
amine." (Emphasis added.) Id., 59 N. W. 2d at 
791. 
POINT II. 
IN THE'SE CASES THE COMMISSION HAD 
rSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUSPEND THE 
LICENSES OF THE UNINSURED MOTOR-
ISTS. 
To support its actions, the Commission relied upon six 
(6) basic types of evidence. These were: 
1. Tihe accident report filed by the investigating offi-
cer. 
2. The accident report filed by the insured motorist. 
3. The accident report filed by the uninsured motor-
ist. 
4. Body Bhop estimates of the cost to repair the dam-
ages. 
5. Personal injury reports filed by injured drivers 
and passengers, which were all signed by a physi-
cian. 
6. In one case (Beth Hurst) there was also a letter 
from the insured motorist. 
None of this evidence was controverted. None of the 
reports, not even those filed by the uninBured motorist, 
estimated the damages at less than $100. 
According to i:Jhe Utah statute, the Commission (De-
partment of Public Safety) is given specific approval to 
use the accident reports required by Section 41-6-35. The 
statute states : 
"Report of accident required by section 41-6-35, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, shall con-
tain information to enable the commission to de-
termine whether requirements for deposit of secur-
ity under section 41-12-5 are inapplicable by reason 
of the existence of insurance or other exceptions 
specified in this act. The commission may rely 
upon the accuracy of the information unless and 
until it has reason to believe that the information is 
erroneous ... The operator or the owner shall fur-
nish such additional relevant information as the 
commission shall require." (Emphasis added.) 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-12-4 (1960). 
The Safety Responsibility Act continues by pointing 
out that if the Commissi.on receives an accident report 
which shows e'ither one hundred dollars ($100) in property 
damage or any bodily injury, the Commission shall de-
termine the amount of security required to be deposited by 
the uninsured motorist unless he is specifically excepted by 
the statute. Section 41-12-5 (a), Utah Code Ann. (1960) 
continues by stating: 
". . . The comm1ss10n shall determine the 
amount of security deposit upon the basis of the 
reports or other evidence submitted to it but shall 
not require a deposit of security for the benefit of 
1any person when evidence has not been submitted 
by such person or on his behalf as to the extent of 
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his injuries or the damage to his property within 
fifty ( 50) days following the date of the accident 
... " UtaJh Code Ann. § 41-12-5 (a) (1960). 
The clear meaning of this statute is to equate the sub-
mitted reports to evidence. All the needed reports sholllld 
be on file, and if not, the person suffering property dam-
age or injuries has fifty days in which to submit reports. 
If there is a dispute as to the amount of damage or injury, 
the statute is clear that the injured or harmed person must 
,submit a report if he is to benefit from this statute. As 
Section 41-12-4 points out - if additional relevant infor-
mation .is needed. the Commission will require it. 
In the case at bar, the question to be decided is whether 
the Department of Public Safety, Financial Responsibility 
Division, is justified in suspending a driver's license when 
it is presented with ( 1) the investigating officer's report; 
(2) a report filed by the other driver; (3) an estimate of 
damage by a body shop; and ( 4) a report by an examining 
physician; :all of which estimate the damage at more than 
one hundred doMars ($100). The specific clause in question 
reads as follows : 
" ( B) ut (the commission) shall not require 
a deposit of security for the benefit of any person 
when evidence has not been submitted by sucih per-
son or on his behalf as to the extent of his injuries 
or the damage to hiis property within fifty ( 50) 
days following the accident." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-12-5 (a) (1960). 
The Commission had reports submitted by or on behalf 
of the person injured. The fifty day time period is for 
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additional reports if required by the Commission or for 
additional reports to modify or enlarge the amounts of 
damage or pe:r:sonal injury. 
In the case at bar, none of the amounts were ques-
tioned, nor was there an attempt to modify the stated 
amounts. Therefore, nothing more wa:s needed. The Com-
mission had ample evidence upon which to base its claim. 
It is immaterial rwhether or not the same reports are re-
quired by another statute; the Commission had sufficient 
evidence for its conclusion. 
POINT III. 
THESE RESPONDENTS ARE EX.A:CTLY THE 
TYPE OF MOTORISTS THE STATUTE WAS 
DESIGNED FOR. 
In his decision, Judge Croft pointed out how grossly 
unfair the statute seemed to him as he applied the following 
facts to the statute: 
"Even if an injured party concludes within 60 
days after the accident that his own fault caused 
the accident, all of the reports and information col-
lected by the commission would be on hand from 
which a determination of damage might be made. 
To then say that even though the injured party did 
not intend to seek recovery for his damages, the 
commission can nevertheless require security and 
suspend a license if not filed, seems grossly unfair." 
(R. at 124). 
The facts are not applicable to the instant case. But 
even if those facts did arise, the proper .solution under our 
statute is for the uninsured person to secure and submit a 
document showing he haJs obtained 1a release from liability. 
Uta'h Code Ann. § 41-12-5(a) (1960). The same principle 
wais correctly stated in Agee v. Kansas Highway Comm'n 
Motor Vehicle Dept., 198 Kan. 173, 422 P. 2d 949 (1967) 
as foUows: 
"We might add at this point that our Act con-
tains provisfons for relieving a person, otherwise 
liable, from the necessity of depositing security 
when he hJas either been relea:sed from liability by 
the other parties to an accident, been adjudicated 
not Hable in a court of law, or has entered into a 
wri,tten agreement for payment of all claims arising 
from an accident." Id., 422 P. 2d at 954 .. 
The purpose of financial responsibility laws is to give 
monetary protection to : 
". . . that everchanging and tragically large 
group of persons who while lawfully using the high-
ways themselves suffer grave injury through the 
negligent use of those highways by others." Mission 
Insurance Company v. Feldt, 41 Cal. Rptr. 293 at 
296, 396 P. 2d 709 at 712 ( 1964). 
For this reason the Financial Responsibility Law must be 
liberally construed to foster its main objectives. 
Under the facts of our case, the Commission had sev-
eral reports, each placing the amount of injury or property 
damage above one hundred dollars ( $100) . Merely because 
the plaintiffs could not or did not obtain a release of lia-
bility or because the p'1aintiffs could not provide the secur-
ity required is no reason why the statute should be con-
strued narrowly. The case of Agee v. Kansas Highway 
Comm'n Motor Vehicle Dept., supra, aptly st::tted the gen-
eral view: 
"A second ground alleged for vacating the sus-
pension order was that Agee could neither obtain 
releases from the other parties to the accident nor 
provide the security required. This argument is 
pure sophistry. The provisions of the Act requiring 
security are directed against just such an indi-
vidual. Inability, eifuer to secure releases from 
others involved in the accident, or to provide secur-
ity as required by the Department, is cause for 
entering an order of suspension, not for vacating 
one." Id., 422 P. 2d 1at 955. 
Once the statute is construed in the favor of the public, 
as it should be, it is easily noted thaJt the plaintiffs-respon-
dents are exactly the type of motorists the statute was 
designed to keep off the highway. 
CONCLJUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests thalt for the reasons 
above stated, this appeal should be granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
LAUREN N. BEASLEY 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
